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 Stability and change in embedded relationships: 
Broken ties in Japanese automotive keiretsu 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines how destabilizing pressures interact with embedded exchange relationships 
in an analysis of broken ties between Japanese auto manufacturers and their suppliers. While 
functional, political and social pressures all led to broken ties, their effect differed depending on 
the nature of the tie. We define two types of embeddedness, relational and normative, and argue 
that while political and social pressures lead to breakage of normatively embedded ties, 
relationally embedded ties are robust to these pressures. In contrast, functional pressures, 
specifically, performance, lead to breakage of relationally embedded ties. Our theory and 
empirical findings have implications for the study of networks and embeddedness and for 
research on institutional change in business systems.  
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Stability and change in embedded relationships: 
Broken ties in Japanese automotive keiretsu 
 
Exchange relationships between buyers and sellers are a fundamental component of 
economic organization (Burt, 1983; Williamson, 1985; Whitley, 1992). A large and influential 
body of literature illuminates how this economic activity is embedded in social relationships: how 
it is shaped by norms around appropriate ways to conduct business transactions, supported by 
existing patterns of social relationships, and reinforced as social ties evolve through shared history 
and repeated transactions (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997). 
Researchers have acknowledged that exchange relationships form constantly evolving 
systems and argue that ties should be examined in a demographic context as a longitudinal process 
of formation and breakage (Baker, Faulkner and Fisher, 1998). Yet while much research has 
studied the formation and deepening of ties (Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999), few studies 
have examined their dissolution (but, see Levinthal and Fichman, 1988; Seabright, Levinthal and 
Fichman, 1992; Baker et al., 1998 for exceptions). 
A better understanding of the dissolution of exchange ties is significant not only to 
understanding embeddedness and interorganization ties per se, but is also relevant to theorizing 
institutional change across business systems. Comparative research on business systems around 
the globe indicates that business systems may be distinguished in part by their characteristic 
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patterns of exchange relationships. These patterns vary in the degree to which typical ties are arms 
length rather than embedded in rich social relationships, in the norms around the value of long term 
ties versus transactions of shorter duration, and in the typical network structures formed by 
configurations of closely tied exchange partners (Whitley, 1992; Biggart and Guillen, 1999; Hall 
and Soskice, 2001). While researchers argue that the interaction of global forces with these 
existing systems leads to distinct trajectories of change that will maintain diverse business systems 
(Guillen, 2001), very little theory or research has attempted to consider the mechanisms by which 
these destabilizing influences interact with existing relationship patterns. Understanding the forces 
that lead to the breakage of exchange relationships and how the patterns of breakage differ across 
different types of tie is critical to understanding how industries and economies evolve and the 
pressures that lead to change.  
The Japanese automotive industry of the 1990’s provides a particularly interesting setting 
in which to examine dissolution of exchange relationships and how this leads to changes in 
business systems. In the 1980’s and early 1990’s, relationships between Japanese auto 
manufacturers and their suppliers received much attention as a new paradigm for exchange 
relationships (Smitka, 1991; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Auto manufacturers and suppliers 
maintained high levels of interdependence, partial ownership stakes, long histories of relationships, 
and personal ties at various levels. These configurations of buyers and their core suppliers, linked 
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by equity ties, were often referred to as “keiretsu,” and researchers argued that the benefits of these 
keiretsu relationships for learning and governance were key to the success of the Japanese auto 
industry (Dyer, 1996).  
In the 1990’s, however, the industry faced a number of internally and externally generated 
threats. With the burst of the asset and real estate bubbles in the early 1990’s and declining 
domestic demand in Japan, the performance of many firms declined drastically, and the auto 
industry was no exception. An influx of foreign investors in Japanese equity transformed the 
ownership structure of many firms, replacing Japanese financial institutions with their long-term 
perspectives with foreign investors demanding return on their investment. The 1990’s also showed 
a reduced confidence among Japanese themselves in postwar economic institutions such as 
permanent employment and keiretsu. 
In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework to explain how various types of 
destabilizing pressures interact with embedded ties. We use this framework to analyze the 
dissolution of network ties in exchange relationships between Japanese auto manufacturers and 
suppliers between 1987 and 1996. Our argument revolves around the notion that the effect of 
various destabilizing pressures on an exchange relationship depends on the interaction between the 
nature of the destabilizing pressure and the type of tie. We argue that two types of embeddedness 
characterize exchange relationships between Japanese auto manufacturers and suppliers. One, 
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which we refer to as “relational embeddedness,” consists of interpersonal relationships, shared 
routines and language, and trust—in other words, the deepening social relationships that are 
intertwined with exchange relationships. The other, which we term “normative embeddedness,” 
refers to the prevailing social norms concerning how easily exchange relationships can be broken.2 
Following Oliver (1992), we identify three types of destabilizing pressures: functional, political 
and social. We argue that each of these pressures exerts its influence through a different 
mechanism and that these mechanisms have different effects on relationally versus normatively 
embedded ties. Taken together, this line of argument provides a plausible account of how the path, 
and thus the outcome, of change depend as much on the preexisting patterns of relationships as on 
the destabilizing pressures.  
In the following section, we provide an overview of different concepts of embeddedness, 
the different types of destabilizing pressures, and the mechanisms through which they are likely to 
influence different types of ties. We generate a set of propositions based on this framework. We 
then examine the empirical case of the Japanese automotive industry, and develop specific, 
testable hypotheses based on the propositions generated earlier. We test these hypotheses on a data 
                                                  
2 Greenwood and Hinings (1996) also use the term “normative embeddedness” to describe 
practices that are defined and maintained in a normative context, though they do not use the term 
to specifically refer to types of exchange relationships. 
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set of purchase-supply transactions between 1987 and 1996 among the 11 Japanese auto 
manufacturers and 380 suppliers across 103 parts.  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Concepts of embeddedness 
Our theoretical starting point is that economic transactions are not sealed off from the rest 
of society, but are rather permeated by social influences. While this embeddedness perspective can 
be traced back to the work of Karl Polanyi (1957), its major contemporary influence derives from 
Granovetter’s 1985 article, in which he argued that economic behavior and institutions “are so 
constrained by ongoing social relations that to construe them as independent is a grievous 
misunderstanding” (Granovetter, 1985). While Granovetter concentrated primarily on “ongoing 
social relations” as viewed through social network theory, other researchers viewed 
“embeddedness” more broadly as including cultural, cognitive, and normative influences. Zukin 
and DiMaggio (1990), for example, categorized embeddedness into four types: cognitive, cultural, 
structural, and political, while Swedberg (1997) identified influences deriving from networks 
theory, cultural sociology, and organization theory, especially institutional theory. Institutional 
theory in turn recognizes various categories of social influence, such as DiMaggio and Powell’s 
(1983) coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphic processes and Scott’s (2001) schema of 
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regulatory, normative, and cognitive “pillars” of institutionalization. Even Granovetter’s (1985) 
more restricted view of embeddedness as deriving from concrete social relations (rather than 
general societal values) was ambiguous as to whether the important factor was the topology of the 
overall pattern of ties in which an actor was embedded, or rather the norms and personal 
expectations that accompanied such relations. Consequently, subsequent work on embeddedness 
has drawn from a wide variety of formulations. Yet despite this variety there are several broad 
themes that repeatedly appear. One is that ongoing exchange with a given partner tends to make the 
partner’s unique identity increasingly salient, thus “personalizing” the tie. We refer to this as 
relational embeddedness and describe it in detail in the next paragraph. Another theme is that 
societal norms from outside (or predating) the tie influence the expectations that partners have for 
each other and the range of behaviors that they will seriously consider. We refer to this as 
normative embeddedness and elaborate on its definition and characteristics after our description of 
relational embeddedness.  
Relational embeddedness refers to exchanges in which the specific identity of the 
exchange partners carries significant weight: through shared history and relationship-specific 
investments, including the development of private procedures and routines, the exchange partners 
develop a bilateral dependence and a sense of partner-specific obligation and reciprocity. The 
specificity of these relationships has been shown to enhance the flow of information, promote trust 
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and provide an alternative governance structure for transactions (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997; 
Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995).  
While relational embeddedness is built on the specificity of partners’ identities  and is by 
definition a property of each individual tie, normative embeddedness refers to standards for 
appropriate behavior that apply to all ties of a given type within a particular field. These normative 
elements provide rules for how transactions are to be conducted across organizational fields 
(Biggart and Guillen, 1999; Fligstein, 1996; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996), and they vary across 
organizational fields. The existence of such standards is most easily seen in research on 
comparative business systems, where configurations of interorganizational networks and norms 
for conducting exchange relationships, such as the degree to which transactions are conducted at 
arms length, vary substantially across nations (Whitley, 1992; Hamilton and Biggart, 1988; Sako 
1992). These norms may arise as a response to specific patterns of historical development 
(Hamilton and Biggart, 1988), from underlying cultural factors (Dore, 1987) or through efforts of 
powerful actors to promote norms, or “rules of exchange,” that advance their own interests and 
positions (Fligstein, 1990, 1996).  
 
Embedded ties and destabilizing pressures 
Research to date has primarily focused on the processes by which embedded ties are 
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established (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999) and the effect of embeddedness on outcomes such as 
mutual learning, acquisition of information, and survival (Uzzi, 1997). There has been little 
research on the dissolution of ties, though several papers study the complementary question of the 
persistence of network ties in the face of destabilizing pressures. Levinthal and Fichman (1988), in 
their research on client auditor relationships, found that long-lasting, embedded ties were less 
likely to be broken in the face of changing resource dependencies. Similarly, Baker, Faulkner and 
Fisher (1998) found that long-lasting ties between firms and advertising agencies were more 
persistent and less likely to be broken over time. Romo and Schwartz (1995) found that 
manufacturers considering moves to lower cost regions were less willing to sever embedded ties 
even in the face of immediate cost savings.  
These studies contrast embedded ties to non-embedded ties, but do not distinguish among 
types of embeddedness. If there is more than one type of embedded tie then they may behave 
differently from each other, even while collectively changing more slowly than non-embedded ties. 
Different types of embedded ties may respond to different pressures for change. It is also unclear 
whether being resistant to change merely means changing more slowly along the same trajectory 
as more rapidly changing ties or whether such embedded ties have a different arc of response. 
We argue that the degree to which embedded ties respond to destabilizing pressures 
depends on both the type of embeddedness and the nature of the pressure. Normatively and 
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relationally embedded ties respond very differently depending on the source of the destabilizing 
pressure. In other words, ties are responsive to some pressures for change, but not to others, and 
therefore, it is necessarily to consider the different types of destabilizing pressures and the 
mechanisms through which they lead to the breakage of ties separately. 
An extensive body of literature documents the processes by which institutional fields are 
destabilized and give way to broad changes (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Tushman and 
Romanelli, 1985; Fligstein, 1990). Oliver (1992) classifies these destabilizing influences as 
functional, political, and social pressures. Following this framework, we examine each type of 
pressure, specify the different mechanisms through which it fosters change, and derive 
propositions based how susceptible each form of embeddedness is to those mechanisms.  
Functional pressures: Oliver (1992: 572) defines functional pressures as the conflict 
between “economic criteria of efficiency or effectiveness” and institutionalized practices. A long 
tradition in research in organization theory has documented how these functional pressures lead to 
organizational change. Firms rethink once effective practices to adapt to new environmental 
contingencies (Thompson, 1967; Chandler, 1977). Declining performance is a strong signal of 
maladaptation and triggers the need to search for more effective practices (March and Simon, 
1958; Cyert and March, 1963).  
Relationships between buyers and suppliers may be particularly susceptible to 
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reconsideration under times of economic stress. As Tushman and Romanelli (1985: 177) note: “As 
webs of interdependent relationships with buyers, suppliers and financial backers strengthen, and 
as commitments to internal participants and external evaluating agents are elaborated into 
institutionalized patterns of culture, norms and ideologies, the organization develops inertia, a 
resistance to all but incremental change.” Functional pressures are likely to lead to a crisis that in 
turn sparks disruptive change, and leads firms to reconsider these existing routines and patterns of 
operation. While such reconsideration could implicate both normatively and relationally 
embedded ties, these existing routines and patterns are some of the particular elements that 
stabilize relationally embedded ties and support their performance advantages. We therefore 
expect functional pressures to have a particularly strong destabilizing effect on relationally 
embedded ties.  
 
Proposition 1: Functional pressures will have a greater effect on the breakage of relationally 
embedded ties than on normatively embedded ties.  
 
Political pressures In Oliver’s (1992: 570) framework, political pressures for change 
occur as organizations seek to resolve conflict with external actors who question the value of an 
institutionalized practice. Organizations are particularly likely to respond to demands of external 
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actors on which they are dependent for critical and non-substitutable resources (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). Such actors include buyers and suppliers, providers of financial capital, and the 
state. Changes in the identities, relative power, or nature of the demands of these actors are likely 
to pressure firms to abandon existing routines and relationships.  
Organizations respond to political pressures not only by actually making the changes that 
are demanded, but also by coopting the source of pressure, avoiding situations of influence, and 
responding symbolically rather than substantively to these demands (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Westphal and Zajac (1998) show this divergence between actual 
technical demands and managing the expectations and needs of external constituencies in 
adoptions of, and investor response to, corporate governance practices. They find that firms 
manage expectations of investors symbolically by announcing long-term incentive plans but not 
implementing them. Investors respond to both the symbolic and real, driving up share price even 
when the plan is not implemented. For institutional investors, one step removed from the 
operations of the firm and unable to evaluate the substance of a reform, such symbols may be 
enough.  
Because political actors are likely to be at a distance from the inner workings of a firm, 
they are unable to evaluate whether changes are real or not, and thus may be satisfied by symbolic 
changes. Consequently, we expect political pressures will lead firms to change behaviors that are 
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less closely tied to core operations. To translate this into our schema of relationally and 
normatively embedded ties, we predict that political pressures will be more likely to lead to the 
breakage of normatively embedded ties than relationally embedded ones as a way of 
demonstrating compliance to these external constituencies. This is because the rationale for 
normative ties is oriented outward to external legitimacy while the relational ties are oriented to the 
other partner and thus more directly to the content and purpose of the tie and associated 
transactions. By severing normatively embedded ties, a firm can signal its compliance while 
maintaining its more valuable relationally embedded ties.  
Firms may also respond to political pressure by breaking the normatively embedded ties 
because relationally embedded ties are intrinsically harder to break, since they have become 
intertwined with reciprocity, implicit agreements, mutual investments, and social relationships. A 
relationally embedded tie is likely to be accompanied by relationship-specific investments, such as 
production facilities located in close proximity, closely interlinked systems for information 
exchange or parts procurement (Dyer, 1996; Williamson, 1985). Relationally embedded partners 
are likely to have developed shared language, shared routines—familiar and certain ways of doing 
things. While the economic viability of these ties may have waned, they may be costly and difficult 
to break in the short term (Romo and Schwartz, 1995) and absent necessity, firms are likely to first 
dissolve the normatively embedded ties. We will come back to this issue of whether embedded ties 
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are difficult to break for economic or for more social reasons in the discussion section and consider 
it in light of some of our empirical results.  
 
Proposition 2: Political pressures will have a greater effect on the breakage of normatively 
embedded ties than relationally embedded ties.  
 
Social pressures: Changing behaviors can also occur through changes in socially 
constructed norms of legitimate, taken-for-granted behavior. This can occur as new norms of 
appropriate behavior sweep through an organizational field. Researchers have documented 
numerous cases of such sweeping changes. Fligstein (1990) documents abrupt changes in notions 
of legitimate goals and behavior for firms, or what he calls “conceptions of control” throughout the 
history of industrial development in the US. In a study of the publishing industry, Thornton (2002), 
documents changing “institutional logics,” as the emphasis switched from an editorial to a market 
logic. Haveman and Rao (1997) document changing institutional logics in the U.S. savings and 
loan industry, and their association with changes in organizational forms. 
Norms around appropriate behavior in exchange transactions may also change through a 
process of deinstitutionalization, or a degrading of legitimacy constraints that hold these 
relationships together. This can occur through a process of dissipation (Oliver, 1992), in which 
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notions of legitimacy of a practice simply decline when denied of ongoing support. It can also 
occur through a process of safety in numbers, in which increasing rejections of a practice (such as 
rejections of permanent employment) relax the legitimacy constraints that supported that practice 
(Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001). In both of these cases, the effect is a wearing down of the 
legitimacy constraints that lead to normative embeddedness, leading to a greater propensity of 
breakage.  
 
Proposition 3: Social pressures due to weakening of legitimacy constraints will have a greater 
effect on the breakage of normatively embedded ties than relationally embedded ties.  
 
The context: The Japanese auto industry 
We apply this framework to the process of dissolution of network ties in the Japanese auto 
industry in the 1990’s. In the 1980’s and early 1990’s, relationships between Japanese auto 
manufacturers and their suppliers received much attention as a new paradigm for exchange 
relationships (Smitka, 1991; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Nishiguchi, 1994). Auto manufacturers 
and suppliers were found to maintain high levels of interdependence, partial ownership stakes, 
long-histories of relationships, and personal ties at various levels. These configurations of buyers 
and their core suppliers, linked by equity ties, were often referred to as keiretsu, and researchers 
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argued that the benefits of these keiretsu relationships for learning and governance were key to the 
success of the Japanese auto industry (Dyer, 1996). 
In the Japanese auto industry, normative and relational embeddedness were particularly 
significant. Compared to other organizational fields (for example, the US auto industry), all of the 
ties in the Japanese auto industry were normatively embedded, that is, there were strong normative 
pressures against breaking ties (and thus tie breakage was extremely rare across all types of ties). 
Scholars comparing Japanese supply relationships and those of western economies noted that there 
was a general sense in these relationships of what Dore (1987) referred to as “goodwill” and Sako 
(1992) referred to as “obligational” contracting, which included a strong tendency towards 
long-term relationships with business partners. Sako (1992), in her study of contracting 
relationships in Japan and Great Britain, found that Japanese manufacturers and suppliers 
generally had greater expectations of the long-term durability of a relationship regardless of the 
specific details, such as degree of asset specificity, of that transaction. Dore (1987) argued that 
normative expectations towards exchange relationships in Japan stemmed from Confucian roots of 
reciprocal obligations. 
Within this general normative context encouraging long-term relationships, there was a 
smaller subset of relationally embedded ties. These relationships encompassed a greater amount of 
communication, trust, long-term outlook, shared research and development, and ongoing 
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collaboration in manufacturing. These most deeply embedded relationships tended to be overlaid 
by equity ties. Ahmadjian and Oxley (2006) showed that in the Japanese auto industry, auto 
manufacturers tend to hold shares in those suppliers that dedicate a large percentage of their sales 
to them. Lincoln and Ahmadjian (2000) showed how equity ties accompany dispatch of both 
senior executives and employees, and thus provide a structure for personnel exchange. In their 
study of Japanese business groups, Lincoln, Gerlach, and Takahashi (1992) found that equity ties 
overlaid purchase-supply and financial transactions. In Japanese, the term keiretsu commonly 
refers to firms that are tied through equity stakes, and the presence of an equity tie delineates the 
supplier’s membership in an auto manufacturer’s closest circle of relationships.  
It is important, in the Japanese context, to understand these ties not simply as ownership 
ties, or financial investments for capital gain, but rather, as specific governance mechanisms 
through which to manage relationships. There has been some debate as to the specific role of 
these ties—and whether they should be seen largely as symbols of commitment (e.g. Gerlach, 
1992) or more specific governance mechanisms such as hostages (e.g. Ahmadjian and Oxley, 
2004; Flath, 1993; Gilson and Roe, 1993). Regardless of the specific mechanism by which they 
operate, however, these ties are important as delineating relationships between suppliers, and 
drawing the lines around an inner set of core relationships. In this paper, we use equity ties as a 
way to distinguish the relationally embedded from the normatively embedded relationships.  
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Destabilizing forces in the Japanese auto industry: In the 1990’s, the Japanese auto 
industry encountered a variety of destabilizing forces, functional, political, and social in nature. 
During the 1990’s, many Japanese firms were hit hard by declining asset prices, declining demand, 
and burdens of over-expansion during the 1980’s boom. These performance pressures were likely 
to cause auto manufacturers to rethink the ways that they have been doing business. They gave 
auto manufacturers a justification to break long-standing ties, and made them more willing to incur 
the costs of breaking familiar routines and relationships. However, not all auto manufacturers were 
affected equally. While Nissan was virtually bankrupt in the 1990’s, Toyota and Honda reported 
some of their best years ever. 
 
H1: Performance will have a greater effect on the breakage of relationally embedded (equity) ties 
than normatively embedded (non-equity) ties.  
 
 An alternative argument to H1 is that performance pressures will lead to greater breakage 
of normatively embedded ties as firms work even more closely with relationally embedded 
suppliers. We believe that while this may be the case when a crisis is seen as a short-term 
phenomenon that can be overcome, dropping corporate profits in Japan in the 1990’s were due to 
decreased domestic demand, excess capacity, and unproductive deployment of human and 
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physical assets, and required more than a temporary adjustment. While this crisis may have driven 
firms more closely into the arms of some relationally embedded suppliers, it also gave them an 
opportunity to sever or decrease relationships with relationally embedded suppliers that were 
somehow misaligned with current corporate goals and had lost their value.  
The Japanese auto industry also faced political pressures in the form of an upsurge in 
foreign ownership of shares. These foreigners included both institutional investors investing for 
their portfolios and foreign auto manufacturers trying to increase their global reach through stakes 
in Japanese auto makers. By the end of the 1990’s, after our analysis ends, a number of foreign 
auto manufacturers had taken controlling stakes in Japanese firms—Renault in Nissan, Ford in 
Mazda, GM in Isuzu. During the period covered in this paper, however, foreign shareholders held 
large minority stakes, which did not afford them direct control. 
These foreign investors tended to bring their own standards of “appropriate” business 
practices. Interestingly, while the embedded purchase-supply relationships of Japanese auto 
makers had once received international attention and praise, foreign investors tended to see them 
as outdated and inefficient. When Renault completed its takeover of Nissan in the late 1990’s, for 
example, one of its first acts was to dismantle Nissan’s keiretsu of suppliers.  
  Since foreigners did not hold controlling stakes in the Japanese automakers during the 
period we study, they were not able to dictate how supplier relationships were to be managed and 
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hence their pressure was largely political. These foreign shareholders could influence the 
automakers through exercising voice, by speaking up about how they thought the firm should be 
run, or by threatening exit through selling their shares. We predict that auto manufacturers 
responded to this political pressure through symbolic behavior that placated external pressures but 
did not affect core relationships.  
 
H2: Foreign shareholders have a stronger influence on normatively embedded (non-equity) ties 
than relationally embedded (equity) ties.  
 
 Finally, the exchange relationships in the Japanese auto industry during this period 
experienced social pressures as Japan experienced a shift in attitudes towards the value of 
long-term relationships. One reflection of this was the increased propensity of Japanese firms to 
downsize as the 1990’s progressed, reflecting declining normative constraints on severing implicit 
long-term contracts with employees (Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001).  
We predict that this change in attitudes from the more relational 1980’s to the 
decreasingly relational 1990’s led to breakage of normatively embedded ties. As an example of 
this tendency, consider the end of the relationship between Nissan Motors and Nissan Life 
Insurance. Nissan Motors and Nissan Life were linked through long-term historical ties. Nissan 
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Motors did not own shares of Nissan Life, but sent directors to its board. When Nissan Life faced 
financial disaster, it approached Nissan Motors (and Hitachi, another firm with long-term 
historical ties) for help. Both firms said no, arguing that there was no reason to maintain the 
relationship since Nissan Life had no ongoing business value to them (though Nissan Life sold 
insurance to their employees). In other words, Nissan Motors’ tie with Nissan Life was 
normatively embedded, and was severed. This episode received substantial media attention as an 
example of changing attitudes towards long-term obligations. Underlying this attention was the 
implication that this sort of tie would not have been broken in an earlier period.  
These declining legitimacy constraints picked up momentum in the mid-1990’s. 
Downsizing, for example, began to accelerate from 1993, reaching a peak in 1996 (Ahmadjian and 
Robinson, 2001). For this reason, we expect to see the effect of declining legitimacy constraints 
only in the period between 1993 and 1996.  
 
H3: The decline of legitimacy constraints led to greater breakage of normatively (non-equity) 
embedded ties than relationally (equity) embedded ties between 1993 and 1996.   
 
 22
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample: The sample encompasses supply transactions for all major automobile 
manufacturers in Japan in 1987, 1990, 1993 and 1996. We obtained information for these 
transactions from two reports published by IRC, a Japanese business information firm. One, 
Jidōsha Buhin no 160 Hinmei no Seisan Ryūtsū Chōsa (“A Survey of Manufacture and 
Distribution of 160 Auto Parts”), was published in 1987 (IRC, 1987; 1996). We used the follow-up 
report, on 200 auto parts, to update the transactions for 1990, 1993, and 1996. These reports cover 
most of the major parts categories, except for steel and body parts. For each part, the IRC reports 
the name of each supplier and the number of units it sold in each year to each auto manufacturer. 
There is some difference in the parts covered for each year. We limited our sample to only parts 
that IRC reports transactions for all 4 years, 1987, 1990, 1993, and 1996 (although analyses with 
an unbalanced panel, of any part reported in any year provide very similar results). Because we 
analyzed change in ties, the data set contained observations for three years: changes in ties from 
1987-1990, from 1990-1993, and from 1993-1996. 
The initial sample contained a total of 11 auto manufacturers, 380 of a total of the 483 
suppliers that appeared in any of these 4 years, and 103 parts categories, for a total of 5123 of the 
6987 transactions reported across the 4 years. (After removing 3 outliers, as described below, the 
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final sample had 5120 observations). Each observation is an auto manufacturer/supplier/part triad, 
and there is a separate observation for each transaction between an auto manufacturer with a given 
supplier for a given part.  
Dependent variables: The dependent variable is a binary variable representing the 
existence of a broken tie. We define broken ties in several ways. First, and most obviously, a 
broken tie occurs when a buyer does not purchase a part from a supplier from which it purchased 
parts the previous period (recall that our data source reports transactions at 3 year intervals). We 
call this a 100% broken tie. Broken ties of this nature were relatively rare. We believe that though 
completely broken ties are an important measure of dissolution of relationships, large decreases in 
purchases should also be considered as broken ties since they represent significant downgrades of 
exchange relationships. For example, in the 1990’s, one of the authors interviewed the head of 
procurement at the factory of a major auto manufacturer that had just announced that it was 
breaking its exchange relationship with a supplier. This news had received prominent attention in 
the media as demonstrating that long-term purchase supply relationships were breaking down. It 
turned out that while the buyer cut its purchases from the supplier dramatically, it still intended to 
maintain a lower volume of orders. 
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In order to capture relationships that were reduced but not completely severed, we defined 
the dependent variable as different levels of reductions in transactions. Broken ties of 50% or more 
occurred when a buyer reduced its purchases from a supplier by 50% or more from period t-1 to 
period t. We calculated broken ties of 70% and 30% in a similar fashion.  
One concern with this measurement of broken ties is that they may have represented a 
temporary decrease in transactions rather than a permanent break. To examine this possibility, we 
looked at the number of times a tie decrease was followed by an increase. For the 100% break, we 
found that of 25 ties that were broken between two periods, in only 1 case did the transaction 
resume in the following period (we looked at the periods 1987-1990, 1990-1993, and 1993-1996 
since we do not have data after 1996). For a 70% break, only 4 of 72 breaks resumed, for 50%, 10 
of 170 breaks resumed, and for 30%, 35 of 357 breaks resumed (and those that resumed tended to 
do so at a very low level). This indicates that the larger breaks tended to be permanent, while 
smaller breaks were more likely to be fluctuations in trading volume.  
Independent variables: Our primary measure of relational embeddedness is whether an 
auto manufacturer held an equity stake in a supplier. As we noted above, in Japan, equity ties tend 
to overlay relationally embedded exchange relationships. An examination of equity ties in our data 
set demonstrates the close relationship between equity ties from buyer and supplier and other 
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connections. For example, an equity tie is more likely to be associated with the dispatch of 
directors to sit on a board (correlation .69), as well as with the use of at least one of the same main 
banks (correlation .40). Equity stakes are correlated with the dependence of a buyer on a supplier 
(.21), and a supplier on a buyer (.51). 
Data for equity ties for listed suppliers came from Kaisha Nenkan (Nikkei, various years), 
annual corporate reports for 1989 and 1998 (reporting equity ties for 1987 and 1996). For unlisted 
suppliers, we obtained a binary measure from the IRC report. Since use of a continuous measure of 
equity stake would have limited our sample to only listed suppliers, we used the binary variable 
(equity stake or not) for all suppliers. Equity ties were remarkably stable between 1987 and 1996 
with none broken during this period. 
We included one measure of performance of auto manufacturers: return on assets in 
between year t-1 and year t (measured as ordinary income, keijyō rieki, divided by total assets). We 
also conducted analyses using change in sales between these two years and found the results were 
similar to those for ROA. These data came from the Nikkei NEEDS database. To measure the 
degree of competition from newly entered foreign suppliers, we counted the number of newly 
entered foreign suppliers of a part between period t and period t-1. Foreign suppliers were nearly 
non-existent prior to 1990. We also included the total number of suppliers for a given part, 
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calculated from the IRC reports. Foreign ownership was the percent of a firm’s shares held by 
foreign investors in the year t-1 and was obtained from Nikkei NEEDS. Table 1a summarizes how 
the variables map onto our hypotheses.  
We controlled for the total share of an auto manufacturer’s purchases of the part from a 
given supplier (in the previous period), since breakage of 50% or more is likely to be affected by 
the size of the share initially. Other controls included the total share of a supplier’s sales of a given 
part that went to the auto manufacturer in the previous period, the number of different parts 
transacted between a given auto manufacturer and supplier, and the size of the auto manufacturer 
(log of total assets). We were unable to control for supplier size, because this information was 
available only for listed suppliers, but we included a binary variable equal to one if a supplier was 
publicly listed as a proxy for size. 
Analytical approach: The unit of analysis was the automaker/supplier/part triad, across 
each of three years (1987-1990, 1990-1993, 1993-1996). The dependent variable was a broken 
tie (of 30%, 50%, 70% and 100%). Our hypotheses consider the effects of various destabilizing 
pressures on exchange relationships overlaid by equity, and those without equity ties. Our 
analyses, then, involve comparing the effect of the different explanatory variables in these equity 
and non-equity sub-samples.  
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The unit of analysis is the auto manufacturer/supplier/part triad, and thus, there is a 
separate observation for each transaction between an automaker with a given supplier for a given 
part. Each dyad is observed over 3 years. While researchers have addressed the issue of 
interdependence between dyads (Lincoln, 1984), triads make for a particularly complex data 
structure. We have dealt with the problem of interdependence between triads in several ways. First, 
we used a probit procedure with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on supplier (White, 
1980). We also estimated models with clustering on automaker and part and the results are similar. 
The robust estimator obtains consistent standard errors even when the correlation structure 
assumed by a probit model is violated, and allows us to relax the assumption that observations of 
the same firm are uncorrelated across time. We included fixed effects for years. In supplementary 
models (available from the authors) we included fixed effects for auto manufacturers, and found 
that the results were virtually unchanged. 
We also included in our models a modified version of Lincoln’s (1984) auto-regression 
term. We calculated three auto regression terms: the mean of the dependent variable across all 
triads (except for the focal triad) that contain parti, the mean of the dependent variable across all 
triads (except the focal triad) that contain automakerj, and the mean of the dependent variable 
across all triads (except the focal triad) that contain supplierk.  
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We first analyzed the pooled sample, combining transactions overlaid by equity and 
those without equity (see for example, Column 1 of Table 3). Next, we constructed a set of 
variables that broke down each independent variable into two variables: one that took the value 
of the variable when equity=0, and 0 when equity=1 and the other that took the value of the 
variable when equity=1, and 0 when equity =0. For example, we created two variables for profit, 
ROA0 and ROA1. ROA0 was equal to ROA when equity=0, and equal to 0 when equity =1, while 
ROA1 was equal to 0 when equity =1 and equal to ROA when equity =0. Column 2 of Table 3 
shows the estimates for all independent variables when equity=0, while Column 3 shows the 
estimates for all independent variables when equity=1. These estimates are all from a pooled 
model, in which the variables for the equity=0 and the equity=1 conditions are combined and the 
constant suppressed. To test whether the variables of interest (return on assets, foreign ownership, 
and year) had different effects on broken ties in the equity and non-equity sub-samples, we 
conducted Wald tests. Column 4 reports the chi-squared and significance levels for these tests for 
the hypothesized variables. 
We conducted diagnostic tests for model fit, using Pregibon’s dbeta (1981), which 
measures the degree to which coefficients change when one observation is deleted, in order to 
detect observations that have inordinately large patterns of influence. We removed 3 observations 
with dbeta of greater than 1 and therefore our analyses are on 5120 observations.  
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 RESULTS 
Table 1b shows that an increasing percentage of exchange relationships were broken 
across the three periods. Interestingly, the propensity to break ties decreased slightly in the 
1990-1993 period, and then increased considerably in 1993-1996. Tables 4-7 report results of 
probit analyses for different levels of tie breakage.  
Table 4 presents analyses of 100% breakage of ties. As Table 1b shows, completely 
broken ties were quite rare, even as the rate of breakage increased between 1993 and 1996. 
Consistent with H1, profitability, as measured by return on assets, had a significantly different 
effect in the equity and non-equity samples. Tie breakage was more sensitive to performance in 
relationally embedded (equity) relationships than in the normatively embedded relationships 
(non-equity). Contrary to H2, foreign ownership did not have any effect on 100% tie breakage. 
Supporting H3, the increased propensity to break ties between 1993 and 1996 was apparent only in 
normatively embedded ties.  
Table 5 shows analyses of broken ties of over 70%. As for 100% ties, the functional 
pressure of profitability was significantly related to broken ties in the equity sample, while social 
pressure, measured by the year 1996, led to breakage of non-equity ties. The difference in the 
effect of foreign ownership in the two groups was still not significant, although it was positive and 
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significant in the non-equity group, and negative and non -significant in the equity group. Table 6, 
with breaks of 50%, further confirms this pattern, with significant differences in coefficient 
estimates for performance in 1996, and insignificant differences for foreign ownership, though in a 
direction consistent with our predictions. Results for breakage of 30% or more are weaker, though 
they follow the predicted pattern.  
Although these results are generally consistent with our hypotheses, they pose several 
puzzles. The first is the relatively low significance levels of foreign ownership. One explanation is 
that the variance is relatively low, and levels of significance would be higher in a sample with 
higher variance on the dimension of foreign ownership. Because the effect of foreign ownership 
forms a consistent pattern across the analyses of different levels of breakage (except for 30%), and 
because foreign ownership does have a significant effect on breakage in the sample of equity ties, 
we conclude that there is evidence consistent with our prediction that foreign ownership is more 
likely to lead to breakage in normatively embedded ties.  
Another puzzle is the decline in the propensity to break ties between 1990 and 1993. As 
we noted earlier, the loosening of normative constraints against breaking of ties accelerated 
between 1993 and 1996, and therefore normative constraints against tie breakage were still strong 
between 1990 and 1993. Therefore, while we cannot explain the decline in tie breakage, this period 
of decreased tie breakage did not coincide with weakening normative constraints, and thus, is not 
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evidence to disprove our assertion that weakening normative constraints led to tie breakage.  
While our primary focus is not on the establishment of new ties, it is nevertheless 
interesting to consider how (and whether) broken ties were replaced. Table 8 shows the changing 
propensity to extend new ties over the three periods in our sample. The increasing propensity to 
add new ties between 1993 and 1996 suggested that new ties replaced broken ties. However, Table 
9 shows that manufacturers were more likely to establish new ties with suppliers in which they 
already had an equity stake and in suppliers from which they already purchased multiple parts. In 
other words, new ties were more likely to be extended to relationally embedded suppliers.  
 
DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we developed a framework to explain the dissolution of embedded ties as an 
interaction between different types of destabilizing pressures and different natures of 
embeddedness. We argued that different pressures for change act through different mechanisms 
and therefore, while functional, political, and social pressures all lead to the breakage of network 
ties, they do so in different ways. The influence of these three types of destabilizing forces depends 
on whether a tie is relationally or normatively embedded. Relationally embedded ties are overlaid 
by strong social relationships, high degrees of collaboration and interaction, and investments in 
relationship-specific assets. Normatively embedded ties, on the other hand, have a lower level of 
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this sort of relational intensity, but are embedded in a more general set of norms surrounding the 
duration of exchange relationships.  
We applied this framework to the Japanese auto industry from 1987 to 1996, and found 
that functional pressures led to the breakage of relationally embedded ties, while political and 
social pressures led to breakage of normatively embedded ties. We further found that auto 
manufacturers tended to establish new ties with suppliers with which they already had a 
relationship.  
This research extends theory on interorganizational relationships and their response to 
destabilizing forces in several ways. First, while researchers have identified different pressures for 
change and noted that these pressures can come from functional, political, and social sources, our 
framework goes one step further in highlighting that these different types of pressures may have 
very different outcomes. Second, our paper contributes to research on embeddedness and 
interorganizational networks by providing a framework for understanding de-embeddedness, or 
dissolution of ties. Furthermore, we extend research on embeddedness by distinguishing between 
different types of embedded relationships and their implications of the evolution of networks.  
Our findings that political and social pressures lead to dissolution of normatively 
embedded ties, that the increasing propensity to dissolve ties has not been matched by a greater 
rate of tie formation, and that new ties tend to be formed along the lines of existing relationships 
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suggest a “paradox of de-embeddedness.”3 The dissolution of ties does not necessarily mean a 
greater propensity towards arms-length transactions. In fact, the combination of breakage of 
normatively embedded ties and replacement of broken ties with new ties based on existing 
relationships suggests a trend towards even higher levels of relational embeddedness. The 
“paradox of de-embeddedness” is that breaking of embedded ties may lead to greater 
embeddedness as relationally embedded ties replace normatively embedded ones.  
This “paradox of de-embeddedness” adds some insight into the debate over changes in 
Japanese economy. While some observers have argued that there have been dramatic changes in 
business practices such as buyer-supplier relationships, others see far more continuity (see Dore, 
2000, and Yamamura, 1997, for views that emphasize continuity and the business press, especially 
The Economist, Financial Times and Nikkei, for accounts of change). Our research suggests that 
change and continuity co-exist, but occur in very different circumstances. As normative 
constraints against breaking long-standing relationships fade, relationally embedded ties persist 
and even strengthen.  
One of the important questions remaining is why firms maintain relationally embedded 
ties. Is it because they are useful and productive? Or, is it because they are the most difficult to 
break, being overlaid by social relationships, implicit agreements and sunk costs in 
                                                  
3 Uzzi (1997) used “the paradox of embeddedness” to contrast the advantages of moderate levels 
of embeddedness with the problems at high levels. 
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relationship-specific investments? Other researchers have noted this dilemma. Seabright et al. 
(1992:154) note: "Empirically, it is difficult to distinguish between attachments that reflect 
transaction efficiency and those that reflect the embeddedness of a relationship, as the two 
properties are likely to covary. Indeed, it is hard to imagine the development of highly specific 
relationship capital that does not engender some element of social ties." The fact that 
low-performing firms do break relationally embedded ties, however, suggests that at least some of 
these ties may be less than optimal, and there are performance advantages to breaking them. On the 
other hand, the propensity of successful firms to maintain their group of relationally embedded 
suppliers suggests that the benefits of relationally embedded exchange relationships remain.   
Our research did not extend past 1996, but developments after 1996 suggest that the 
process we document here continued. Toyota, a steadily high performer, remained committed to 
its existing patterns of close, relationally embedded purchase supply relationships, while troubled 
(and, eventually, foreign-owned) Nissan increasingly pushed both normatively and relationally 
embedded suppliers aside. As foreign manufacturers took controlling stakes in Japanese 
automakers, including Mazda and Isuzu, keiretsu relationships increasingly broke down in favor of 
larger suppliers with greater volume and global scope. One of the biggest changes after 1996 was 
that auto manufacturers such as Nissan not only decreased their dependence on many suppliers, 
but began to sell their equity stakes in suppliers, something not yet seen in 1996.  
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Limitations and opportunities for future research: There are a number of limitations in 
this study. Some of them are difficult to surmount due to data, while others open up promising 
areas for future research. While we believe that, based on our knowledge of the Japanese auto 
industry and interorganizational relationships in Japan, equity is a good proxy for relational 
embeddedness, finer-grained measures of embeddedness would be useful. However, although in 
theory it is possible to collect finer-grained measures of embeddedness through surveys, there are 
problems with this approach besides the usual ones of cost, response rates, and reliability of 
self-reports. The question of buyer-supplier relationships has become politically charged in Japan, 
with firms balancing external demands to unwind old relationships to increase profits with 
maintaining obligations to existing suppliers. Automakers seem less willing today to discuss 
purchase-supply relationships with outsiders than they were 10 or 15 years ago, when the question 
was how other countries could duplicate Japan’s success, rather than how Japanese companies are 
dealing with financial distress and a difficult external environment. We think that the best approach 
to further advancing this framework may be to apply it to other industries where alternative 
measures of relational embeddedness are more readily available.  
Future development of our theoretical framework would benefit from research in settings 
that provide better measures of social pressures for change. Because we only have measures of 
broken ties in four years (over a ten year period) and because normative pressures for change only 
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became apparent between 1993 and 1996, the best we can do is to measure the effect of the year 
1996 on changes. It is possible to obtain more detailed measures of attitudinal changes through 
rhetoric in the press and by the government, as well as measures of the spread of practices that 
reflect attitudinal change, such as downsizing. Research that more closely correlates these 
measures with annual measures of broken ties, perhaps from another industry, would be useful.  
Our framework could also be extended to consider in more detail the characteristics of the 
supplier—for example, size, global reach, and technical capabilities. Particularly interesting would 
be a study of the factors that lead a buyer to break ties with a poor performing or less than capable 
supplier with which it has a strong, relationally embedded tie.  
Finally, this research has implications for the study of business systems and change. 
While there is a general understanding that local institutions shape the process by which business 
systems evolve, much less has been said on how this actually happens. This paper offers an 
example in which destabilizing pressures affect different types of relationships in different ways, 
leading to an outcome that is neither complete transformation nor inertia; rather, different elements 
change at different paces and for different reasons. We believe that further development of theory 
on business systems will benefit from a closer look at exactly how local institutions, be they 
interorganizational linkages or other sorts of practices, policies or norms, interact with different 
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Functional (H1) ROAt-1 Greater for relationally embedded tie 
(equity) than normatively embedded 
tie (non-equity) 
Political (H2) Percentage foreign 
ownership 
Greater for normatively embedded tie 
(non-equity) than relationally 
embedded tie (equity) 
Social (H3) Time (dummy for ‘96) Greater for normatively embedded tie 
(non-equity) than relationally 
embedded tie (equity) 
 
Table 1b:  Broken ties over time 
(Broken ties as a percentage of all buyer-supplier transactions for a given part) 
 1987-1990 1990-1993 1993-1996 
Broken ties 
(100%) 
.015 .001 .061 
70% .035 .022 .099 
50% .057 .048 .134 
30% .110 .108 .193 
 
 45
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (n=5120)  
 mean Standard 
deviation 
minimum maximum 
Breakage of 50% or more .081 .273 0 1 
Breakage of 30% or more .139 .346 0 1 
Breakage of 70% or more .053 .224 0 1 
Breakage of 100% .026 .161 0 1 
Log assets 13.97 .905 12.65 15.77 
Roa t-1 .029 .026 -.027 .107 
Total number of suppliers for 
part 
7.57 3.75 2 20 
Foreign ownership t-1 .124 .127 .004 .433 
Year=93 .332 .471 0 1 
Year==96 .357 .479 0 1 
1=equity stake in supplier .203 .402 0 1 
% buyer’s inputs from  
supplier (t-1) 
.491 .345 0 1 
% supplier’s inputs from 
buyer 
.384 .383 0 1 
Total number of different 
parts transacted  
3.46 4.69 1 26 
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Table 3:  Correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Breakage of 50% or more 1.00           
2 Log assets           
          
            
          
             
             
         
           
-0.02 1.00
3 Roa t-1 -0.03 0.46 1.00
4 Foreign ownership t-1 0.08 -0.06 -0.17 1.00        
5 Total number of suppliers for part 0.08 0.05 -0.01 0.02 1.00
6 % buyer’s inputs from  supplier (t-1) -0.18 -0.13 -0.02 -0.07 -0.11 1.00      
7 % supplier’s inputs from buyer 0.01 0.38 0.18 -0.03 0.42 0.15 1.00
8 Year=93 -0.08 0.00 -0.41 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00
9 Year=96 0.13 0.02 -0.01 0.21 0.08 -0.06 0.00 -0.53 1.00
10 1=equity stake in supplier -0.06 0.37 0.20 -0.09 0.13 0.21 0.51 0.00 -0.02 1.00
11 Total number of different parts transacted by buyer and supplier -0.04 0.16 0.15 -0.10 -0.11 0.19 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.25 1.00
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Table 4: Broken ties of 100% (probit with robust standard errors, 5120 
customer/supplier/part triads) 
 Broken ties, 
pooled sample 
Broken ties, with 
equity 
Without equity Significance of  
difference* 
(Wald test) 







Roa t-1 1.791   






Total number of suppliers for 
part 
-.004    






Foreign ownership t-1 -.104    






Year=93 -.973***    
(.272)    
n.a. -.834**   
(.267)     
 
Year==96 .657***    






1=equity stake in supplier -.017    
(.151)     
   
1=listed supplier .107    






% buyer’s inputs from  
supplier (t-1) 
-1.592***    






% supplier’s sales to buyer .379**     






Total number of different 
parts transacted by buyer and 
supplier 
-.039*    






Constant .823*    
(1.010)     
   
N 5120 1039 4081  
Log likelihood -471.21              
(*p<.05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001, one-tailed tests; auto-regression term included in regression but 
not reported)  
* Chi-square and significance level 
 48
 
Table 5: Broken ties of  >70% (probit with robust standard errors, 5120 
customer/supplier/part triad) 
 Broken ties, 
pooled sample 
Broken ties, with 
equity 
Without equity Significance of  
difference* 
(Wald test) 
Log assets -.169***    
(.045)     
-.035    
(.199)     
-.203***    
(.048)     
 
Roa t-1 -2.689    
(1.948)     
-25.204***    
(6.565)     
-.921    
(2.092)     
13.11*** 
Total number of suppliers 
for part 
.005    
(.009)      
-.059   
(.038)     
.010    
(.009)     
 
Foreign ownership t-1 .510    
(.430)      
-.881    
(1.316)     
.779*    
(.461)      
1.34 
Year=93 -.347**   
(.138)     
-1.791***    
(.489)     
-.263*     
(.140)     
 
Year==96 .419***    
(.099)      
-.140    
(.246)    
.439***      
(.103)      
5.23* 
1=equity stake in supplier -.330**    
(.115)     
   
1=listed supplier .216**   
(.081)      
.079    
(.285)      
.209**    
(.080)      
 
% buyer’s inputs from  
supplier (t-1) 
-1.047***    
(.128)     
-2.547***    
(.481)     
-.905***    
(.130)     
 
% supplier’s sales to buyer .350**   
(.119)      
.828*    
(.458)      
.306**    
(.120)      
 
Total number of different 
parts transacted by buyer 
and supplier 
-.011    
(.010)     
.010    
(.016)      
-.018    
(.014)     
 
Constant .831    
(.700)      
   
 
N 5120 1039 4081  
Log likelihood -908.25              
(*p<.05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001, one-tailed tests; autoregression term included in regression but 
not reported) * Chi-square and significance level 
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Table 6: Broken ties of  >50% (probit with robust standard errors, 5120 
customer/supplier/part triad) 
 Broken ties, 
pooled sample 
Broken ties, with 
equity 
Without equity Significance of  
difference* 
(Wald test) 












































1=equity stake in supplier -.263* 
(.117) 
   























Total number of different 











   
 
N 5120 1039 4081  
Wald chi2 249.86    
Log likelihood -1264.90    
(*p<.05; ** p <.01; ***p < .001, one-tailed tests; autoregression term included in regression but 
not reported) * Chi-square and significance level 
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Table 7: Broken ties of  >30% (probit with robust standard errors, 5120 
customer/supplier/part triad) 
 Broken ties, 
pooled sample 
Broken ties, with 
equity 
Without equity Significance of  
difference* 
(Wald test) 
Log assets -.058*    
(.034)     
.040    
(.093)      
-.073*    
(.037)     
. 
Roa t-1 -2.690*    
(1.415)     
-7.712**   
(3.258)     
-1.942    
(1.569)     
2.55 
Total number of suppliers 
for part 
.007    
(.007)     
-.015    
(.017)    
.012   
(.007)      
 
Foreign ownership t-1 .468    
(.300)      
.992     
(.603)      
.529    
(.322)     
.51 
Year=93 -.147    
(.098)     
-.293    
(.193)     
-.138     
(.110)     
 
Year==96 .237**    
(.086)      
-.048     
(.165)     
.261***    
(.094)     
2.63 
1=equity stake in supplier -.278***   
(.076)     
   
1=listed supplier .210***   
(.059)      
.323*     
(.167)      
.181**    
(.063)      
 
% buyer’s inputs from  
supplier (t-1) 
-.829***   
(.074)    
-1.296***   
(.222)    
-.732***    
(.078)     
 
% supplier’s sales to buyer .319***   
(.085)      
.674**    
(.237)      
.275**    
(.087)      
 
Total number of different 
parts transacted by buyer 
and supplier 
.002    
(.005)      
-.002    
(.010)     
.004    
(.006)      
 
Constant -.524    
(.535)     
   
 
N 5120 1039 4081  
Log likelihood -1878.54             
 (*p<.05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001, one-tailed tests; auto-regression term included in regression but 
not reported) 
* Chi-square and significance level 
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Table 8: New ties 
(New ties as a percentage of 16,537 possible buyer-supplier ties for a given part) 
 1987-1990 1990-1993 1993-1996 
New ties .023 .024 .032 
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Table 9: Determinants of new ties (probit with robust standard errors, 16537 
customer/supplier/part triads) 
 
 New ties 
Log assets .041   
(.025)      
Roa t-1 .201   
(1.175)     
Total number of suppliers for part -.023***    
(.006)     
Foreign ownership t-1 .534**   
(.172)      
Year=93 .022    
(.072)      
Year==96 .146*    
(.067)      
1=equity stake in supplier .620***    
(.123)      
1=listed supplier -.014    
(.064)     
Total number of different parts transacted by 
buyer and supplier 
.065***    
(.018)      
Constant -2.484***    
(.342)    
N 16537 
Log likelihood -1942.19                
 (*p<=.05; ** p <= .01; ***p <= .001, one-tailed tests; auto-regression term included in regression 
but not reported) 
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